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AFTERWORD - STRAIGHTNESS AS PROPERTY:
BACK TO THE FUTURE - LAW AND STATUS
IN THE 21 ST CENTURY
BertaEsperanzaHerndndez-Truyo1*
Shelbi D. Day"
I. INTRODUCTION

As is evident from the other works in this Symposium, throughout
history in both the United States and the greater Western World, statusbased exclusion of individuals and groups from property rights has been
central to the existence of political and social hierarchies. Specifically,
exclusion based on status - whether it be nationality, culture, race, sex or
sexuality - has plagued our history and has been integral in the formation
and development of both constitutional and property law regimes.
Consequently, both regimes are at best uneven in the grant and distribution
of rights and benefits.
A forward-looking examination ofthe link between status and property
law reveals the persistence ofthe concerns addressed in the three preceding
articles. The exclusion of persons from enjoyment of full property rights
based on non-normative sexuality status, that is, nonheterosexuality,
routinely and systematically denies property rights to an entire category of
sexual/social minorities. This denial, contrary to liberalisms' basic goal of
equality and justice for all persons, results in injustice and inequality for an
entire group ofcitizens.' Although sexual minorities have always been part
of our social fabric, it is only recently that issues of discrimination and
equality have come to the forefront in the social, psychological, and legal
realms.
More specifically, in recent years, the debate over the denial ofproperty
rights to same-sex couples has emerged as a key theme in equality
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discourse and will undoubtedly extend into the foreseeable future. At the
heart of the debate is whether same-sex couples should be given property
rights equivalent to those of married couples who consequently - by
tradition, practice, and law - are couples of the opposite sex. Primarily,
just as African Americans and women were historically and systematically
denied equal property rights and benefits, gays/lesbians are presently denied
property rights based purely on status. This occurs primarily through the
denial of marital rights, benefits, and protections, and the denial of any
alternative means of obtaining them.2 In recent years, challenges to these
laws have forced scholars and the judiciary alike to begin to explore,
redefine, and redetermine the law's proper parameters in this area.
In order to elucidate the history, legal development, and the possible
future of liberalism's equality goals in this context, this Afterword begins
by reviewing pertinent marriage laws - particularly congressional
regulation of marriage. We then examine how state and federal court
decisions reveal the changing and evolving social fabric within which the
limited definition of marriage, and the closely tied definition of family, play
themselves out. An examination of the different "equality" afforded to
gays/lesbians and heterosexuals follows. The work, then, describes the
relationship between marital status and property rights, explaining the
consequences of a narrow legal definition of marriage within shifting social
paradigms. The piece concludes that just as there came a time in the liberal
republicanism paradigm to recognize its flawed exclusionary origins (of
women, African Americans, Native Americans and Mexicans), the time has
come to cease the dejure creation of a second-class citizenship that denies
sexual minorities property rights based on status.
II. LAW AND MARRIAGE

A. CongressionalRegulation of Marriage
Marriage is defined both legally and normatively as the union of a man
and a woman.3 Congress, in recent years, has refrained from legislating on
most matters of state law. However, in the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act4

2. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (1999). These rights include the right to
worker's compensation survivor benefits, the right to be covered under the spouse's employerissued life insurance policy, the right to be covered as a spouse under a private health insurance
policy, hospital visitation rights, and rights to receive alimony and property division in the event
of a divorce. See id.
3. We can see this in various state and federal statutes that define "marriage" as
exclusively between a man and a woman. See e.g. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
[hereinafter DOMA].

4. Id.
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(DOMA), Congress dove head first into family law regulation - a
quintessential province of state regulation - by defining "marriage" to
mean "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife"5 and "spouse" to mean "only... a person of the opposite sex who is
a husband or a wife." 6 In doing so, Congress effectively excluded same-sex
couples from the legal terms or classifications of"marriage" and "spouse."'
When the Federal government legislated against same-sex marriages, by
redefining pertinent statutory definitions to include only opposite-sex
couples, it showed its power to control and limit benefits attached to
marriage and family. To be sure, in its fervor to further normalize
heterosexuality as the exclusive axis on which relationships can be
recognized, it has also attempted to address, proactively, the anticipated
question of whether same-sex marriages, if recognized in one state, must
also be recognized in other states. With DOMA, Congress not only sought
to define marriage solely as a heterosexual union,8 but also attempted to
deny rights - legislating that states are not obligated to recognize samesex marriages, even if valid in other states.9
Historically in the United States, under traditional conflict of laws rules,
marriages have been valid in every state so long as they are valid under the
law of the state where the marriage was contracted." Similarly, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, in Article IV of the United States Constitution,"
mandates that certain laws be reciprocal and binding across state lines,
requiring each State to give "Full Faith and Credit" to the "public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."' 2 However, a few
authorities, using a public policy rationale, argue that recognition of
marriages is appropriate so long as doing so does not "violat[e] the strong
public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to
the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage."' 3 Conversely,
other authorities, including some courts, use no such public policy
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Interestingly, its attempt is fatally flawed. The definition requires marriage between one
man and one woman. No requirement exists, however, that the parties be one heterosexual man
and one heterosexual woman. See generally RUTH COLKER, HYBRID (1996) (explaining that
sexuality can be fluid and even change over time). Thus, there is no assurance, that even under
Congress' attempt with such draconian regulation, that heterosexuality is promoted by the scheme.
9. See DOMA, at sec. 3, Pub.L.No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.
10. JESSE DuK~mmm & JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 414 (4th ed. 1998).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §I.
12. Id. See Shannon Duffy,, The National Law Journal (Nov. 27, 2000)
<http://www.law.com/> (explaining that although the Full Faith and Credit Clause has not yet
been applied to marriage, the argument could be made).
13. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 414 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1998)).
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exception to limit the validity of marriages interstate, favoring the
reciprocal approach - reflective of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 4
Despite contrary precedent, in DOMA, Congress exhibited a virtually
unfettered power to grant and deny the fundamental right 5 to, and
universal recognition of,marriage and the subsequent control ofsignificant
property rights that legally flow therefrom. When it enacted DOMA 6 in
1996, Congress revealed its exercise of political muscle. In limiting the
definition of marriage as only between a man and a woman," Section 3
deprives same-sex couples social security, tax, and welfare benefits under
federal law.'8
Even more disturbing, Section 2 of the Act provides that no state shall
be required to give effect to a same-sex marriage contracted in another
state.' 9 Thus, Congress effectively overrode the dictates of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause with respect to same-sex marriages. Now, even if samesex marriage or an alternative recognition entitling gays/lesbians equivalent
benefits becomes available under state law, DOMA - through
Congressional fiat - allows marriage to be classified as null and void
outside the territorial boundaries of that particular state.2 ° Such
Congressional action raises serious Constitutional issues, such as whether
DOMA deprives same-sex couples significant property rights, equal
protection of the laws, 2' and the right to travel.22
The legislative proscription against the fundamental right to many to a
whole group of people because of their sexual/affectional orientation is a
14. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 414; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
15. See infra Part I1.B. (developing marriage as a fundamental right).
16. DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419.
17. See id. (defining "marriage" to mean "only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife").
18. See id.
19. See id. at sec. 2, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419. "No State ... shall be required
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State... respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State... or a right or claim arising from such relationship." Id.
20. See generally Shannon Duffy, The National Law Journal (Nov. 27, 2000)
<http://www.law.com/>. In July 2000, Vermont gave same-sex couples the right to a civil union
- an equivalent legal alternative to marriage. See id. A vast majority of same-sex couples who
obtained licenses resided in states other than Vermont. See id. Thus individual state courts will
be forced to rule on the validity of the civil union licenses - outside of Vermont - in the near
future. See id. Currently, approximately 35 states have "mini-DOMAs" in effect, banning the
recognition of same-sex marriages. See id This displays the reach of DOMA and evidences the
extent of Congress' power to regulate and allocate rights and personal choices.
21. How, and to what extent Equal Protection plays into this area of law is complicated and
heavily debated. We do not attempt to, nor do we claim to, delve into this argument with the
limited space and depth of our discussion within this Afterward.
22. Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples,
and The Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. 553 (Winter 2000).
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fundamentally flawed outlook that denies full personhood to nonheterosexuals. The definition of marriage as the union of a man and a
woman - as construed by Congress in the public sector and religious and
social organizations in civil society - deprives same-sex couples access to
the institution of marriage or an alternative legal structure. With this
circular reasoning - denying same-sex couples access to a civil marriage
license or a comparable legal status and defining marriage in a way that
same-sex couples will never fit - the federal government effectively
excludes an entire class of people not only from the deep rooted, historical
method of publicly valuing a relationship, but also the bundle of critical
legal benefits that flow from marriage.
B. Case Law Developments
Congressional exclusion of same-sex couples from access to marriage,
while not surprising as a matter of social statement, is at odds with the
concept of marriage as a fundamental right. Throughout history, the
Supreme Court has emphasized the value of marriage and routinely struck
down legislation that was designed to interfere with or preclude this right.
As early as 1923, in Myer v. Nebraska,23 the Court included marriage as a
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment and concluded that arbitrary legislative activity may not
interfere with such liberties.24 Almost twenty years later, in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,25 the Court first explicitly characterized the right to marriage as
a specific fundamental right.'
To be sure, the recognition by the Skinner Court of the fundamental
nature of marriage bespeaks its importance not only to society in general,
but also to individuals and their sense of self. After all, marriage is the
outward expression of one's identity and one's autonomous choice to
associate in the most intimate of ways. Accordingly, not even three decades
ago, the Court acknowledged this view of marriage in Loving v. Virginia"
by repealing anti-miscegenation statutes prohibiting interracial-marriages. 8
The Loving Court recognized marriage as a fundamental right - a right
of each citizen of this country to make decisions concerning his/her most

23. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. See id. at 390-400.
25. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
26. See id. at 541. The Skinner Court deemed marriage to be one of the "basic civil rights
of [men and women, a right that is] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
Id.
27. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. See id. at 12; see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 84-85 (Haw. 1993) (holding that,
on its face and as applied, the Hawaii marriage statute denies same-sex couples the right to marry
as did anti-miscegenation statutes in Loving).
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intimate relations. 29 The Court further concluded that the deprivation of the

right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.30 Applying strict scrutiny review, the Court held that any
racial regulation of marriage required the government to show that the
regulation served a compelling interest to achieve a narrowly tailored end
using the least restrictive means possible. 3 The Court reasoned that "[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and
women].'32 Most recently, in Roe v. Wade,33 the Court recognized marriage
as an extension of liberty.34 It is significant that this right to liberty dates to
the Declaration of Independence." The Declaration, made in the spirit of
liberalism and during the apogee of liberal 36theory, guarantees all persons
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
Moreover, in the domestic sphere, familial status traditionally fits within
the confines of the marital relationship. Courts, as well as society, tend to
define family as stemming from a marital relationship, such that family and
marriage are almost synonymous. These norms hold true in property and
estate/trusts regimes where conveyances of property flow through, devise,
and transfer from and within the familial relationship, centered around the
mother/father patriarchal relationship.37

29. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
30. See id.
31. See id. "The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not
be restricted by invidious racial discriminations." Id. The Loving Court established that
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications,
especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny'
[citation omitted] and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be
necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth
Amendment to eliminate.
Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 12.
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. See id.at 152-53 (finding that marriage, an unenumerated fundamental right, falls
within the right to liberty and under the umbrella of the fundamental right to privacy). While the
right to privacy is not explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, the language of the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments support the notion that fundamental rights are not limited to those
explicitly stated and that marriage falls under the penumbra that creates a zone of privacy. See id;
see also Zabolocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978) (finding a law precluding issuance
of marriage licenses invalid and recognizing the "right to marry" as a fundamental right).
35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
36. Id.
37. For example, descent and distribution laws not only allow but indeed mandate certain
percentage distribution to a surviving spouse.
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The same principle of family as a basic organizing structure of society
holds true in the international context where international human rights
documents recognize the family as the basic architectural component of
society.3" As such, privacy in family life is expressly protected, as is the
freedom to choose one's life partner.39
Notably, both domestically and internationally, the composition of the
household and conception of "family" is changing. In fact, the traditional
notion of "family" with a wage-earning father at the "head of the
household," a stay-at-home mother, and children has become the exception
rather than the norm.'0 As discussed in Part IV, this change in the
composition of a household or "family"' has resulted in the growing need
for a broader, more diverse and inclusive definition of "family."
Consequently, and in light of the established nature of marriage as a
fundamental right, it seems appropriate to revisit socio-legal conceptions
of marriage and family.
Furthermore, the prohibition of same-sex marriages is, in many ways,
analogous to race-based regulations of marriage. As previously stated, the
law in Loving was a status-based prohibition that served only to preclude
interracial marriage - something apparently deemed "undesirable" by the
majority. But, the regulation in Loving did not survive constitutional

38. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights denies "arbitrary
or unlawful interference" with privacy. I.C.C.P.R., March 23, 1976, art. 17, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/63 16 (1966). The European Convention on Human Rights states, "Everyone
has the right to respect for his [or her] private and family life ..."Eur. Cony. for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5.
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence." U.D.H.R., Dec. 10,
1948, art. 12, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810.
39. See Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 82 (1999) (visited Nov.
20,2000) <http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Judgments.htn> (requiring "particularly serious reasons"
before Article 8 of the European Convention justifies intrusion into the private realm of sexuality);
Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 186 (1989) (deciding that Ireland's criminal law
against male homosexual sex violates Article 8 of the European Convention); Dudgeon Case, 4
Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1981) (holding that the United Kingdom's law against homosexual
sex a violation of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention).
40. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 18 (1989); see also
RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 213 (2nd ed. 1999).
41. See CHUSED, supranote 40, at 213. "Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic increase
in the number of unmarried parents, single parent families, and unmarried cohabitants.
Homosexual men and women, even if not greater in numbers than in prior history, have become
more willing to publicly discuss their sexual preferences and openly form households." Id.; see
also OKIN, supra note 40, at 18 (explaining that "[m]ore families these days are headed by a
single parent; lesbian and gay parenting is no longer so rare; many children have two wageworking parents, and receive at least some of their early care outside the home.").
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scrutiny.42 Today, similarly situated restrictive statutes precluding marriage
to same-sex couples should experience a similar fate.43
III.

THE DIFFERENT EQUALITY OF SEXUAL MINORITIES

The government's denial ofrights to a particular group of citizens based
purely on status as same-sex couples may effect also an infringement of
rights under the Equal Protection clause." Romer v. Evans45 perfectly
illustrates the deprivations that result from such arbitrary governmental
regulation. The Romer Court recognized that the legislature's use of its
power to deny protection based on status results in the exclusion of an
entire group from access to certain protections that have been expressly
afforded by the municipality.4' The enactment challenged in Romer was an
amendment to the Constitution of the State of Colorado, adopted in a 1992
statewide referendum (hereafter referred to as Amendment 2), repealing
ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of "homosexual,
' The
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."47
claim made by proponents of Amendment 2 was, ironically, that the nondiscrimination laws were providing special benefits and thus were
discriminatory."
The proposal for Amendment 2 was in direct response to the adoption
ofordinances by various municipalities that banned discrimination based on
sexual orientation.49 Seemingly, these municipalities sought to ensure
equality5" by prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, specified

42. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
43. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 86 (Haw. 1993) (concluding that in harmony with the Loving
Court's observation "any State's powers to regulate marriage are subject to the constraints
imposed by the constitutional right to the equal protection laws").
44. See id. at 48. Here, the court reasoned that marriage is a civil right recognized as such
by the U.S. Supreme Court for over 50 years and suggested that petitioners have a valid Equal
Protection argument where the statute denies same-sex couples' access to marriage. See id.
However, the court did not address whether gays/lesbians constitute a suspect class for purposes
of Equal Protection scrutiny. See id. Much controversy and debate - which we will not address as
it is beyond the purview of this essay - surround the question of which type of Equal Protection
scrutiny should be applied to laws regulating gays/lesbians.
45. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
46. See id. at 635.
47. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST., art. I, § 30b amend. 2).
48. See id.at 626. "The State's principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that it puts
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons. So, the State says, the measure does
no more than deny homosexuals special rights." Id.
49. See id. "What gave rise to the statewide controversy was the protection the ordinances
afforded to persons discriminated against by reason of their sexual orientation." Id. at 624.
50. See id. In the interest of equality, local ordinances protected "persons discriminated
against by reason of their sexual orientation." Id. A local ordinance in Denver defined "sexual
orientation" as "[tihe status of an individual as to his or her heterosexuality, homosexuality or

20001
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transactions and activities, health and welfare services, housing,
employment, and education.5
The State, however, claimed that the amendment, not the local laws,
created equality by preventing the grant of special rights.52 In reality,
gays/lesbians/bisexuals by state law fiat were put in a solitary class with
respect to both private and governmental spheres, and denied legal
protection or remedy from inevitable discrimination.53 The Romer Court
explained that the only way a state can discriminate against a non-suspect
class' is when "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws... coexist[s] with the practical
necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with
resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons."" Additionally, to
pass constitutional muster, the law must neither preclude a fundamental
right nor target a suspect class, and must bear a rational relation to some
legitimate end that can be achieved through no better alternate means.56
The Court concluded that Amendment 2 was invalid because it failed to
meet even a rational basis inquiry and it imposed a broad, across the board
disability on an entire class of citizens." Additionally, the amendment was
incoherent with respect to the State's proffered reasons, and explicable only
as discrimination and animus toward the class it intended to affect - gay,
lesbian, and bisexual persons.58 Rational basis analysis itself seeks to ensure
that classifications are not drawn for the sole purpose ofdisadvantaging the
group burdened by the law. The Romer Court found that Amendment 2
served to do just that: single out a specified minority and effectively deny
it protection.59

bisexuality." Id. (quoting Denver Rev. Municipal Code, art. IV, § 28-92).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 627.
53. See id
54. The Romer Court avoided engaging in an analysis to determine which classification
sexual orientation fits under. See id. at 631-32. However, much controversy exists as to whether
sexual-orientation should fit under a more strict standard of analysis because it may be analogous
to race, sex or prohibitions based on religion.
55. Id. at631 (quoting Personnel Adm'rof Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,271-72 (1979)).
56. See id. In Equal Protection analysis, it is essential to determine "the relation between
the classification adopted and the object to be attained." Id. at 632. This relation gives the Equal
Protection Clause substance, "provides guidance and discipline for the legislature" and defines
the limits on the laws that it may pass. Id
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 633. "If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the
legislature, its impartiality would be suspect." Id. (quoting Railroad Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 181 (1980)).
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The Court found such discriminatory regulations contrary to current
jurisprudence and in violation of the Constitution's guarantee of Equal
Protection.' To be sure, impartiality and equality for all citizens have
become necessary principles that the government and each of its
components should embrace, promote, and foster.6' The Romer Court
restrained the legislature's attempt to overreach its power and limit the
availability ofbenefits and rights to an entire group.62 Expressing particular
concern for the harms effected by the amendment,63 the Court noted that
regulations such as Amendment 2
raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. '[I]f
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.'"
Finally, the Court found that the Amendment served only to make
gays/lesbians/bisexuals unequal to heterosexuals, a practice specifically
prohibited by current law and the Constitution.65
Notwithstanding the majority opinion, the Romer decision also reveals
a fault line in seeking to obtain equal protection for sexual minorities: an
attempt by both the courts and Congress to distinguish
gays/lesbians/bisexuals from sex and race-based classes by defining

60. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-34.
61. See id at 633. "Equal Protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities." Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)).
62. See id. at 634. "A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection
of the laws in the most literal sense." Id The Romer Court explained:
We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed at any identifiable legitimate
purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state
interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something
the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.

Id. "[C]ilass legislation... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment ...."
Id. at 635 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)).
63. See id. (explaining that "Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement
that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them
immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that
may be claimed for it.").
64. Id. at 634 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
65. See id. at 635. "A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws." Id.
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gay/lesbian/bisexual status as conduct-based." For instance, in his dissent
in Romer, Justice Scalia conflated status and conduct, urging that identity
as a gay/lesbian/bisexual and "homosexual conduct" are so interrelated that
status is, in effect, conduct.67 He concluded that sexual-orientation is
conduct based, and therefore gays/lesbians can obtain equal rights and
benefits by simply changing their conduct.68 In proposing this analysis,
Justice Scalia disturbingly likened gays/lesbians to polygamists and
murderers.69
More recently, in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,70 a majority of the
Court seemed to endorse this conflation of status and conduct, and thus
reinforce discrimination against homosexuals by allowing the Boy Scouts
to exclude a gay leader from the organization. The Dale Court, shielding
its reasoning behind the First Amendment's protection of expressive
association, concluded that simply including a gay man in the Boy Scouts
would send a message that would change the message of the organization. 7'
Such conclusion is puzzling because precedent would suggest that the
appropriate analytical approach would be to uphold the pertinent public
accommodation statute.72
In fact, by reasoning that homosexuality is so conduct-based that simply
including a gay man changes the Boy Scout's message, a message protected
by the First Amendment, the Court effectively reinstitutionalized
discrimination. Undeniably, the precedent set in Dale affords the
government even more power to regulate and discriminate based on

66. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
71. See id. at 2458.
72. See id. at 2455-56. In similar cases relating to sex, race and anti-discrimination broadly,
the Court has routinely found slight infringement on the First Amendment appropriate where
discrimination would result. See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-29
(1984) (finding an antidiscrimination statute valid to ensure women equal access even if incidental
abridgement of the First Amendment occurred); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (holding that even if enforcement of the antidiscrimination act
did result in some slight infringement of the members' right of expressive association, it was
necessary and justified to eliminate discrimination against women); New York State Club Ass'n,
Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (concluding that organized discrimination in the
selection of membership did not warrant constitutional protection).
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sexual/affectional orientation." This conclusion is at odds both with
changing social structures and with conceptions of equality and liberty.
IV.

MARITAL STATUS AS A PROPERTY RIGHT CHANGING NORMs

CHANGING FAMILY,

Beyond an equality-based constitutional analysis, protection of sexual
minorities' equality is also significant because of economic considerations.
Marital status is valuable in terms ofproperty rights. Congress has attached
benefits and protections to marriage to the exclusion of those who are not
permitted to be married, namely same-sex couples. In Turner v. Safley,74
the Court supported marriage as a fundamental right because it is not only
a way of expressing public commitment, demonstrating emotional support,
and legitimating children, but also of ensuring entitlement to many benefits,
including governmental financial assistance and property rights." For
example, the myriad legal benefits and protections incident to marital status
include: access to a spouse's medical, life, and disability insurance, hospital
visitation and other medical decision-making privileges, spousal support,
intestate succession, homestead protections, and many other statutory
protections.76
Modem diversity of the family structure and composition pose
interesting challenges to traditional notions of property law. As one scholar
explained,
[s]ignificant differences exist between the property
presumptions typically made when people are married and
when they are not. Community and marital property regimes,
dower and curtesy, homestead laws, intestate succession
statutes, and social security survivor benefits, among others,
73. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
explained that,
[tihe only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then, is that
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their
presence alone-unlike any other individual's -should be singled out for
special First Amendment treatment. Under the majority's reasoning, an
openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label "homosexual." That
label, even though unseen, communicates a message that permits his
exclusion where ever he goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient
justification for his ostracism.
Id.
74. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
75. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 95-96 (striking down a state regulation barring the
ability of prisoners to marry).
76. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 870 (1999).
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depend upon the validity of drawing a7 distinction between
married couples and all other couples.
Accordingly, it is encouraging that some courts have begun to
acknowledge, accept, and seek to accommodate protection of property
rights in light of this shifting family paradigm. Considering the increasingly
diverse composition of present day households, more courts and
legislatures should be prepared to recognize the ambiguity of the term
"family" and to redefine "family" for legal and statutory purposes. Such
paradigmatic shifts raise questions regarding who is, or should be,
protected and acknowledged as being entitled to "family" benefits under
modem property law.
Courts recognize that the constitutional separation-of-powers
framework of our liberal democracy locates in Congress the power to
name, define, or categorize the nature, reach, and extent of rights. Thus, it
is effectively Congress that has the power to afford or recognize gay/lesbian
rights including the property rights that flow from the institution of
marriage. 7' But, under separation-of-powers, the courts have the ultimate
say in whether any restriction of rights is valid or constitutionally
proscribed.
However, as previously noted, in the domestic realm Congress has
routinely restricted unmarried persons from receiving property benefits.
Even on an international scale, with its broad acknowledgment of the
importance and value of family, "the rights to form family structures that
permit participants to enjoy numerous governmental benefits, the benefits
that are designed specifically for families of choice, namely marriages, are
largely unavailable to persons with non-heterosexual orientation."'79 Thus
the denial of marriage to same-sex couples denies certain families property
rights and protections because, statutorily, an entire group is forced into a
status of unmarriage and unfamily.
Changes at the state level indicate the significance of Congress' flex of
power in its wholesale denial of legal benefits and protections to same-sex
couples in "meretricious" relationships. State courts are increasingly faced
with questions of the constitutionality of laws and statutes that preclude the
right of gays/lesbians to access marriage-related legal rights. Even more,

77. See CHUSED, supra note 40, at 213.
78. In both Braschi and Baker, the court recognized gay/lesbian rights but avoided
overstepping the power of the legislature by classifying "marriage" or "family" to include samesex couples. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211 (implying that same-sex couples are included within
the definition of "family" for purposes ofa New York anti-eviction statute (9NYCRR 2204.6(d));
Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (1999).

79. Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Remarks at the American Society of International
Law: 2000 Annual Meeting (April 5-8, 2000) (on file with author).
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state courts are having to address these laws and, as a result, some are
overturning discriminatory statutes.
For example, because of the extensive property rights as well as the
other rights attendant to marital status, in Baker v. Vermont the Vermont
Supreme Court analyzed and ultimately overturned statutes denying
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.80 Specifically at issue was whether
the State of Vermont could exclude same-sex couples from the public,
secular benefits and protections that its laws provide to opposite-sex
married couples.8" The court engaged in statutory and constitutional
analysis to ascertain, ultimately, that it is impermissible to exclude same-sex
couples from the secular benefits and protections offered to married
couples.8 2 Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the denial of
"marital" benefits vis-a-vis the statutory denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was unacceptable.8 " The court reasoned that the state
cannot deprive same-sex couples of the valuable status-based benefits
which flow from a legal marriage. 4
The Baker court held that the state's asserted interests against allowing
same-sex marriage was simply motivated by a long history of intolerance
of intimate same-sex relationships. 5 Although the court found historical

80. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 867; see also id. at 883 (looking to the history of marriage laws
and the importance that the Supreme Court, as well as other courts, have placed on marriage;
emphasizing the historical recognition of marriage as comparable to a contract with legal and
economic benefits).
81. See id. at 883-84. The Baker court listed many of the benefits that legally flow from
marriage, including:
the right to receive a portion of the estate of a spouse who dies intestate and
protection against disinheritance through elective share provisions... preference
in being appointed as the personal representative of a spouse who dies intestate
...the right to bring a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a spouse... the right
to workers' compensation survivor benefits.. . the right to spousal benefits

statutorily guaranteed to public employees including health, life, disability, and
accident insurance... the opportunity to be covered as a spouse under group life
insurance policies issued to an insured's spouse under an individual health
insurance policy . . . the right to claim an evidentiary privilege for marital

communications... homestead rights and protections [under property law and]
...the concomitant right of survivorship... hospital visitation and other rights
incident to the medical treatment of a family member... and the right to receive,
and the obligation to provide, spousal support, maintenance, and property
division in the event of separation or divorce.
Id.; see also infra note 92.
82. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
83. See id. at 889.
84. See id. at 867.
85. See id. at 885-86.
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feat, civil tradition, or religious outlook insufficient justifications for denial
of secular benefits to an entire class of citizens, the court held that
Vermont's own legislation undermined the states' interests against samesex marriage.6 The Baker Court ultimately concluded that legal protection
and recognition of the avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting
relationship
among same-sex couples is a recognition of common
87
humanity.
Notwithstanding its decision, however, the court, rather than rule that
same-sex couples must be allowed to marry, left it to the legislature to
define the structure that would constitute the legal vehicle of inclusion for
same sex-couples in the panoply of marriage-related rights and benefits."'
The court said the legislature could opt to include same-sex couples within
marriage laws themselves, establish a parallel "domestic partnership"
system, or craft an equivalent statutory alternative. 9 Significantly, despite
the ostensibly progressive decision, one Judge vigorously dissented, noting
that anything other than full equality would continue to deny some persons
full citizenship status.9
In the end, however, regardless of what vehicle is ultimately adopted to
afford same-sex couples the full range of public benefits, Vermont has led
the way in recognizing the exchanges between status and property rights.
The Baker court acknowledged that, in light of relevant precedent,
marriage laws seemingly transform "a private agreement into a source of
significant public benefits protections,"' notingspecifically the significant
increasingly valuable benefit/protection aspect of marriage.' Therefore, the
Baker court expressly confirmed that valuable property rights attach to
marital status and concluded that no citizen could be deprived of such
benefits. 93

86. See id at 886. Also, Vermont allows same-sex couples to adopt and has instituted laws
to protect the children and allow custody in the event of separation. See id. at 882.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 886.
89. See id.; see also Shannon Duffy, The National Law Journal(visited Nov. 27, 2000)
<http://www.law.com/>. (explaining that as a result of Baker, the Vermont Legislature gave samesex couples the right to join in civil unions - a legal alternative to marriage).
90. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 901-02 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Shannon Duffy, The
National Law Journal(Nov. 27, 2000) <http://www.law.com/> (arguing that Vermont's civil
union is equivalent to the historical "separate but equal" doctrine). Law Professor Barbara Cox
explained her fear that this standard will "encourage heterosexuals to 'believe that [gays/lesbians]
are somehow less than they are - [gays/lesbians] don't deserve the same rights."' Id. Professor
Cox contends that equality demands allowing "marriage," not just a legal alternative. See id.
91. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 883.
92. See supranote 81; see also Baehr, 852 P.2d 44,84-86 (acknowledging that, on its face,
the Hawaii statue precluding same-sex marriage results in the subsequent denial of marital rights
and benefits).
93. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
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Similar to Baker, but focusing on the "family" relationship of the
partners rather than on marital status, the New York Court of Appeals in
Braschi v. Stahl Associates94 addressed the question of whether the
surviving life partner of a same-sex couple who was sharing an apartment,
should be included within the term "family" for purposes of applying rent
control laws.95 After an objective examination of the relationship of the
parties, the court found that the surviving partner was entitled to seek
' Not surprisingly, the
protection under the statutory definition of "family."96
court failed explicitly to acknowledge the couple as "family," and instead
simply determined that their lives were sufficiently interwoven socially,
financially, and personally such that they "could reasonably conclude that
these men were much more than mere roommates. ..." This implicit
functional definition of family, which took a pragmatic approach in
interpreting a statute so as to expand family-based rights to same sex
couples, effectively acknowledges the value - personal, social, and
economic - that flows from status.
Moreover, in Zablocki v. Redhail,9 S Thurgood Marshall explained that
it would "make little sense to recognize a right to privacy with respect to
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter into
a relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society."99
However, in DOMA, Congress did just that by refusing to recognize some
form of legal familial status for same-sex couples, thus denying same-sex
couples the opportunity to receive reciprocal benefits, create a familial
94. 74 N.Y.2d 201 (N.Y. 1989).
95. See id.
96. See id.at 214.
97. Id. at 213.
98. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
99. See id. at 388-91. Justice Marshall's opinion reiterated past precedent has determined
that "the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals," specifically relying on
Loving. Id. at 384. Further, Justice Marshall noted that
it is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level
of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child-rearing, and
family relationships ....[It would make little sense to recognize a right of
privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the
decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our

society.
Id. at 386; see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (finding anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional
because marriage is a fundamental right, protected by the Constitution); see also Griswald v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (establishing the right to marry as part of the penumbra
of guarantees in the Bill of Rights which create a zone of privacy). According to the Griswald
Court, the marital relationship lies "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees." Id. at 485.
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setting, and have the same securities and benefits as opposite-sex couples.
This approach is not only inconsistent with the evolution of alternative
family structures as some courts, as discussed above, have readily
acknowledged, it inappropriately denies valuable property rights.
V. CONCLUSION: SHIFTING THE STRAIGHTNESS
AS PROPERTY PARADIGM

By refusing to recognize "marriage" beyond the legal union between a
man and a woman, and defining "spouse" as a person of the opposite sex,
the government effectively institutionalizes status-based discrimination
against an entire class of people. This approach abridges marital-based
property rights, along with deprivation ofprivacy, liberty, and basic human
rights. Congress, thus, forces gays/lesbians into a second-class citizenship
role and confirms the value of"straightness" as property."° The Romer and
Baker courts recognized that denial of equal rights to gays/lesbians based
on status alone results in the denial of public benefits and protections
afforded to other groups. Specifically, by denying marriage to same-sex
couples, absent any equivalent alternative, the government denies economic
benefits to couples who are equivalent in all respects except the sex of the
parties involved in the relationship.
The regulation of and denial to same-sex couples of equal benefits and
rights is a reflection of the powerful hierarchical system that permeates
property law. Liberal theory forms the foundation of the protection of
property rights. Embodied in both the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the U.S. Declaration of Independence, republican liberalism
sought to protect individual autonomy and freedom. This resulted in the
framing in our Constitution of the plethora of negative rights of persons rights with which the government shall not interfere. One of the great
ironies of liberalism, however, was its coexistence with slavery and with
laws treating women of all colors as chattel. Its legacy today coexists with
the unfreedoms of sexual minorities who remain de jure second class
citizens deprived of valuable property rights and benefits. Unreformed
liberalism, then, results in the exclusion of sexual minorities from enjoyment
of public benefits because oftheir individual and private choice of partners
- a choice recognized and revered as a fundamental right. This incoherent
application of liberalism renders marriage a power-based, universalized
hierarchy. Moreover, without a paradigm shift, the status quo - much like

100. See Hemindez-Truyol, supra note 79 (explaining that, "The U.S. approach ... wholly
ignores the social reality and consequences of it[s] actions in denying individuals the right to
equality, privacy, dignity and family life. The U.S. approach renders sexual minorities less than
full actors in society relegating them to second class citizenship, in many stages but particularly
in this discussion in the military society.").
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it did with women and slaves in the apogee of liberal theory - effectuates
overt discrimination, this time based on homophobia and
"heteropatriachy."'O'
Interestingly, in anticipation of the Court's use of its own values and
biases to determine whether a fundamental right is infringed, the Court has
set limitations on Congressional acts that exclude individuals from enjoying
such rights. 0 2 The Court has recognized that the realm of ethics and
morality are areas best left to the individual and his/her subjective desires
so long as there is no breach of law. 3 Thus, the constitutional system of
checks and balances °4 makes it the judiciary'sjob to regulate the legislature
via judicial review when legislation denies individuals or groups
constitutional rights and privileges. With respect to regulations affecting
sexual minorities, while it is Congress' responsibility, in the first instance,
to create statutes and regulatory provisions, it is the Court's obligation to
ensure that such regulations do not violate the Constitution.
The Baker decision confirmed an open secret: through definition and
regulation, same-sex couples are routinely denied essential public benefits
and property rights. Ultimately, the government's failure to recognize
same-sex couples as families, causing them to be excluded from economic
and other benefits equivalent to heterosexuals, causes inequality on both
international and national levels.° 5 Wholly contrary to the human rights
idea, pertinent decisions and legislative acts that erode rights based on
gay/lesbian status fall short of full human rights protections and reinforce
discrimination and hate. ' In the end, the law supports "the unsupportable
position that only some families are real,"' 10 7 thus, denying an entire class
basic human, social, and economic benefits and protections that the
government statutorily attaches to marital status.° 8
The only remotely arguable governmental interest to justify the denial
of legal protections and benefits to same-sex couples (through marriage or
a functional equivalent alternative) is an interest in promoting morality and

101. See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:Tracing the Conflations of Sex,
Gender and Sexual Orientationto Its Origins,8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161,207 (1996) (arguing
that the current Euro-American system is heteropatriarchal).
102. See Griswald, 381 U.S. at 486 (overturning a state statute criminalizing the use of
contraceptives because it infringed on the fundamental right to privacy).
103. See id.at 485.
104. See id See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (declaring all legislative power shall be
vested in Congress); id. art. II, § I (vesting executive power in the President); art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(establishing separations of powers as a system of "checks and balances"); art. Ill, § I (declaring
judicial power in the Supreme Court).
105. See Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 79.
106. See id.
107. Baker, 744 A.2d at 898-99 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
108. See Hernfndez-Truyol, supra note 79.
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condemning homosexual sex. However, as the international community has
recognized, any private adult consensual activity should be wholly outside
the purview of government regulation."0
Moreover, subjective moral and religious values are inappropriate bases
upon which to deny public, secular benefits. Where government regulation
is dictated by religious and spiritual practices, the government is out of
place; religious and spiritual traditions are inappropriate locations from
which to allocate public benefits. By denying public property benefits to
citizens solely because of their status, the government blatantly undermines
its aim of autonomy of citizens, respect for privacy, and entitlement to
property rights and benefits. In labeling gays/lesbians as morally wrong and
religiously unacceptable and therefore undeserving of legal recognition and
the resulting legal benefits, the government inappropriately conflates the
religious sphere with the secular realm.
In Romer, Justice Scalia echoed this religious and moralistic basis for
status-based discrimination (sexual/affectional orientation) when he likened
gays/lesbians/bisexuals to murders, polygamists, and those who are cruel
to animals." ° He further expressed that the phenomenon of
gays/lesbians/bisexuals, as a class, gaining political support and becoming
a politically and socially powerful minority, somehow warrants the denial
of equal opportunity and equal protection.' Furthermore, Scalia assumed
that efforts to keep gays/lesbians/bisexuals from gaining political and social
equality or majority support are sufficient interests tojustify discrimination
for the purpose of keeping gays/lesbians/bisexuals subordinate to the
current majority." 2 Here, paternalism and heterosexism are evident in the
dissent's desire to keep gays/lesbians/bisexuals'(political minorities) from
gaining majority support, social-toleration, recognition, and equal treatment
something he apparently finds undesirable." 3
109. See A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, (Hudoc Reference: avREFOO001743) (visited October
11,2000) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/> (overturning, a gross indecency conviction against a British
man who had videotapes in his home showing him having consensual sex with four other men on
the basis that several precepts contained within Art. 8 of the European convention; the respect for
private life, and protection of the rights and freedoms had been violated.); Toonen v. Australia,
Communication, No. 488/1992, HRC Views of Committee, Mar. 31, 1994, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (upholding a right to sexual privacy for citizens of Australia under Art.
17 of the ICCPR).
110. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that
The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social
disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, because those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
communities... have high disposable income ... and, of course, care about
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Quite appropriately, although highly disturbing, the dissent in Romer
defies the current issue of gay/lesbian/bisexuals rights as a cultural war. 4
While we would rather call it a struggle, tensions indubitably exist.
However, these are no different from the tensions that historically have
emerged when a subordinated, disempowered group that was regularly,
systematically, and de jure denied rights, started to demand what they
undoubtedly and justly deserved. The main writings in this symposium
reflect the struggles of Native Americans, African Americans, women,
indigenous peoples, and other ethnic, racial, and religious minorities who
claimed their place at the supper table that had long excluded them. Today
the struggle is to deconstruct the underpinnings of the current "straightness
as property" paradigm.
Congress' conferral of so much economic value to marriage renders
marital status a valuable property right. Consequently, the government's
wholesale preclusion of marriage, equivalent legal recognition, or
alternative structure allowing same-sex couples entitlement and access to
the benefits that opposite couples are allowed, denies access to a
fundamental right that carries with it both emotional and economic value.
Inroads have been made in the private sector to afford property benefits
to those outside traditional relations. In the public sector, as evidenced by
Romer, Baker, and Braschi - at the federal and state levels respectively,
some barriers have started to fall." 5 Given the private nature of choosing
a life partner, the fundamental nature of that decision, and the benefits that
have been created to flow therefrom, a society committed to equality
should allow all citizens to enjoy these protections. After all, if we are to be
a democratic nation truly seeking equality for all, same-sex couples - the
traditionally subordinated minority - should have equal access to rights
and benefits that are routinely and indiscriminately afforded to the
traditional majority.

homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they
possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and
statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power to achieving not
merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.
Id.
114. See id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. For example, 25 states, including Colorado, had repealed their antisodomy laws at the
time of Romer, thus effectively rendering the dissent's justification without merit. See id.at 645
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

